Section 90(1) of the UK Financial Services Act 2012 criminalises the creation of a false or misleading impression in financial markets. Notwithstanding the fact that section 90 does not reference high frequency trading, the statutory language is sufficiently broad to capture high frequency trading strategies where it can be shown that they have created a false or misleading impression as to the price or value of the company share which has been, or is being, traded.
This paper develops a new microeconomic model of corporate criminal liability and shows how the Too Big To Jail problem reduces the deterrence effect of a crime control policy relying primarily on large corporate fines. In the presence of Too Big To Jail firms, prosecutors should shift resources toward prosecutions of individual managers, so they bear a substantial personal risk from dealing dishonestly.
In the wake of the Occupy Wall Street protests, I wrote an appendix to n+1’s The Trouble Is The Banks, cataloging the major malfeasance committed by the banks, as revealed in the legal settlements to date.
For the dissertation component of UCL’s MSc Economic Policy course, I researched how the existence of Too Big To Jail banks changes the microeconomics of financial crime prosecution. By modeling prosecutorial discretion in charging corporations versus their mangers, the dissertation showed that unless managers face a credible threat of incarceration for criminal behavior, authorities will be unable to optimally deter financial criminality by and within financial institutions.
I designed and programmed a custom case management and financial intelligence software tool for the Manhattan District Attorney’s Financial Intelligence Unit